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ABSTRACT
We assess evolution in performance, efficiency and productivity of  Colombia's power distribution utilities
before and after the 1994 regulatory reform that introduced electricity market activities for the power sector in
12 distribution companies from 1985 to 2001. Performance is evaluated contrasting changes in mean and
median by Wilcoxon Rank Sum and Pearson tests on financial and other performance indicators. Technical
efficiency is measured by means of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The nature of the dataset allows the
estimation of  Malmquist productivity index and its evolution in time. Results show a recovery after the reform
in the main performance indicators of  profitability, partial input productivity, and output. Plant efficiency and
productivity increased after the reform, mainly in the largest utilities used as benchmarks in the DEA effi-
ciency scores measures. Meanwhile, the less efficient power distribution companies did not improved after the
reform and were not able to undertake plant restructuring to catch up in plant efficiency with respect to the
Pareto efficient input allocations. Econometric results on DEA efficiency scores suggest a positive effect of
policy reform.
Key words: Electricity distribution, productive efficiency, power sector Colombia, Malmquist productivity index
JEL Classification: L510, L940, Q490.
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RESUMEN
El documento evalúa el desempeño, la eficiencia y la productividad de las empresas de distribución de energía
eléctrica en Colombia antes y después de la reforma regulatoria de 1994, para 12 compañías de distribución entre
1985 y 2001. El desempeño se evalúa al contrastar cambios en medias y medianas mediante las pruebas de
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum y Pearson, sobre indicadores financieros y de desempeño. La eficiencia técnica se mide con la
metodología de Data Evelopment Análisis (DEA). La naturaleza de los datos permita la estimación de índice
de productividad de Malmquist y su evolución en el tiempo. Los resultados muestran una recuperación después de
la reforma en los indicadores de ganancias, productividad parcial de insumos y del producto. La eficiencia y
productividad aumento después de la reforma, principalmente en las empresas de mayor tamaño que se usan como
empresas de referencia en las medidas de eficiencia DEA. Así mismo, las empresas menos eficientes no mejoraron
después de la reforma y no lograron llevar a cabo una reestructuración para lograr alcanzar la eficiencia indi-
vidual respecto a las distribuciones Pareto eficientes. La evaluación econométrica sobre los indicadores de eficiencia
DEA sugieren un efecto positivo generado por las políticas de reforma.
Palabras clave: Distribución de electricidad, eficiencia productiva, índice de productividad de Malmquist.
Código JEL: L510, L940, Q490CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 5
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1. INTRODUCTION
The 1994 regulatory reform of the Colombian power sector was one of first reforms in Latin
America to introduce a market system for the wholesale electricity transactions, and the first to
implement a bidding system for its pool electricity market in the region. In this sense, the
reform took a step forward from the Chilean an Argentinean experiences, which wholesale
electricity prices were based on declared costs rather than on marginal supply prices by 1994.1
The reform introduced competition, established a new industry structure and a new indepen-
dent regulatory agencies, setting up the basis for expansion and diversification of power gen-
eration sources, improving both the sector's efficiency and reliability.
The reform focused on offering incentives for utility efficiency and productivity levels through
the introduction of market competition, independent grid access, and markup price regulation
for power distribution. Inspired in the British reform, the regulatory reform split the traditional
vertical monopoly structure of the power sector into four different activities: generation, trans-
mission, distribution and commercialization of electricity. Power distribution as domiciliary
public service provider faces two types of regulation. The first one is price regulation. The
regulatory commission, Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas (CREG), currently sets the
markup formula for distributors and the design of the pass through component in the final
user's tariffs. In particular, CREG determines: i) direct purchase costs such as the pool sale
price and transportation charges, ii) capacity charges, and iii) costs of the reserve provisions to
stabilize the system and prevent bottlenecks in the transmission system.2  The second type of
regulation concerns quality control, companies are subject to sanctions if their service fails to
meet minimum quality standards. The reforms and regulations led power holdings to undertake
a generalized divestiture process across electricity holdings in order to fully separate power
generation, transmission, distribution, and the setting up of new commercialization activities.
Thus, privatization arose as one instrument for promoting market competition and industry
restructuring, and became a complementary policy within a broad deregulatory context.
The aim of this paper is to provide new empirical evidence on the effects of the regulatory
reform in power distribution in Colombia. To the best of our knowledge there is no a micro-
study assessing the effects of a regulatory reform for power distribution. Nonetheless, several
studies on the Colombian electricity sector after a decade of the regulatory reform have been
published recently. Pombo and Ramírez (2003) test performance in the privatized power hold-
ings and measured plant efficiency for Colombia's thermal stations showing a generalized in-
crease in productive efficiency due to market entry, introduction of cost-saving technologies,
and a positive effect of the new regulation that implied the setting up of a non-regulated mar-
1 A presentation of the regulatory reform in Colombia can be found in Pombo (2001). Estache and Rodriguez-
Pardina (1998) and Mendoça and Dahl (1999) outlines a general presentation of the process in Latin America.
Guash and Spiller (1999) and Kessides (2004) are comprehensive presentations of privatization, regulatory policy
instruments, contract designing and results for several Latin American and developing countries. Nonetheless, the
development of the power sector in Colombian has been poorly documented. IADB Inter-American-Develop-
ment-Bank (2001) provides a short analysis of the sustainability of the power sector reforms in Latin America. For
an international review see Newbery (1999).
2  For details on the British and Colombian formulas see Green and Rodriguez-Pardina (1999) and Pombo (2001).6 PERFORMANCE AND EFFICIENCY IN COLOMBIA’S POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM: EFFECTS OF THE 1994 REFORM
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ket of large clients that boosted transactions of forward electricity contracts. García and Arbelaez
(2002) evaluate the likelihood of merging among power generators acting in the wholesale
electricity market. Larsen, et al. (2004) present a set of aggregate statistics of Colombia's power
sector to highlight the lessons derived from the implementation of market deregulation policies
in Colombia for network industries since 1994.
Despite the above, studies on several dimensions of the electricity market are still pending,
i.e., price collusion on the pool market, consumers' welfare effects, quality regulation and regu-
latory capture, among others topics. This paper provides empirical evidence on the effects
induced by the regulatory reform, focusing on the efficiency and productivity effects upon
power distribution. The paper presents an ex-post performance analysis for regional power
distribution companies based on four elements: i) direct measures of productive efficiency
scores and Malmquist productivity index through data envelope analysis programming (DEA),
ii) changes in means and medians of firm performance variables of profitability, operating
efficiency, labor, investment and sales, iii) an econometric analysis regarding the determinants
and micro-fundamentals of firm efficiency scores by the regional power distributing compa-
nies, and iv) a evaluation of the policy effectiveness on plant efficiency using a two step DEA
decomposition procedure of changes among policy regimes.
The paper structure is organized along four additional sections. Section 2 describes the data
set and the methodology employed to assess utility efficiency in power distribution. Section 3
analyses the results of the performance indicators through the changes in means and medians
and the measurement outcomes of plant efficiency and productivity through DEA efficiency
scores and the construction of a Malmquist index. Section 4 reports an estimation of the policy
effects on plant efficiency resulting from the industry reform and an econometric analysis about
the determinants of utility efficiency scores. Section 5 concludes.
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
2.1 DATA
The data set used for this study includes 12 large electricity distribution companies (EDC)
that cover the 20 largest cities belonging to the so-called National Interconnected System (NIS).
The NIS is the result of the integration of five power systems and markets that the country
used to be divided into before 1994. It covers the Andean region and the Atlantic Coast -
country's northern provinces-.3
One effect of the 1994 regulatory reform was the separation of utility business activities that
were vertically integrated under a monopoly industry. The 1994 “Electric Law” (Law 143) stated
that firms, combining generation and transmission activities had to split up and sell their share of
the transmission grid in order to guarantee a fair entry process for new generators. Firms sharing
generation and distribution were allowed to retain ownership in both activities as long as they
3 Nonetheless, Colombia’s eastern planes, which represent 40% of country’s geographical areas, are outside the NIS.
They include the Orinoquía planes and the Amazon rain forest. These regions still geographically isolated and
consequently they exhibit the lowest population density indicators in the country.CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 7
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kept separate managerial and accounting procedures for each in order to avoid cross-subsidizing
non-profitable services. The same criteria applied for new power companies. Therefore, the in-
dustry reached an almost complete separation of services, promoting competition in generation,
keeping the natural monopoly structure of transmission and local distribution, and allowing some
sort of contestability for the distribution services given a strict regulation and follow-up of regu-
latory agencies able to impose sanctions or changes in ownership upon bad performance.
Before 1994, Colombia's power sector was divided into five big regional markets, which per-
form all types of activities: the Bogotá Power Company [Empresa de Energia de Bogotá (EEB)];
the Atlantic Coast Regional Electric Corporation [Corporación Regional de la Costa Atlántica
(CORELCA)], Public Enterprises of Medellín [Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM)], Cali Power
Company [Empresas Municipales de Cali (EMCALI)] and the Cauca Valley Corporation
[Corporación Autónoma del Valle del Cauca (CVC)] and finally the Colombian Power Institute
[Instituto Colombiano de Energía Eléctrica (ICEL)]. These holdings were formed by publicly
owned utilities at municipally or regionally levels. In addition, the national grid company
[Interconexión Eléctrica S.A (ISA)] was the largest nationwide power generator and transporter.4
Table 1 synthesizes the pre-reform and post-reform structure of each of the above holdings.
There are two sources that explain power sector restructuring. One came from direct divesti-
tures i.e.: ISA. The other relied on privatization and equity transfers contracts. Privatization
started with the selling of power generating units, such as hydroelectric substations and ther-
mal plants. Then it moved toward power distribution companies and networks. Power transmis-
sion remained concentrated in ISA as the natural monopoly.5
Before the reform three out of the seven power holdings participated in power generation,
transmission and distribution. To comply with Law 143, EEB was partially privatized and
divested into three independent firms: EMGESA (generation), EEB-transmisión (transmis-
sion) and CODENSA (distribution). CORELCA was divided into four firms: GENDELCA
(generation), TRANSELCA (transmission) which was acquired for ISA, and two distribution
firms ELECTRICARIBE and ELECTRO-COSTA which were sold to foreign investors. EPM
split its management but kept its ownership structure. On the other hand, the reform led to
privatization of CVC.
EMCALI and ICEL holdings, which were formed mainly by electricity distribution companies,
were only required to separate managerial and accounting functions for each activity. Therefore,
only two out of five power distribution networks have been privatized. It is important keep in
mind that the city  of Bogotá is still the largest shareholder of CODENSA and EMGESA. More-
over, EPM, EMCALI, and ICEL are still owned by municipalities, therefore are public utilities.
They cover around 50% of residential users for the NIS. Privatization, financial restructuring, and
4 Interconexión Eléctrica S.A (ISA) was founded in 1967. By that time, the sectoral development view was to consoli-
date ISA as the largest nationwide power generator and transporter of bulk electricity following the vertically
integrated natural monopoly model of Electricité de France. EMCALI and CVC belong to the same regional
electricity market. The city of Cali, the third largest in the country, is the capital of the Valle del Cauca province. For
more details about Colombia’s power sector history see the World-Bank (1991). A description of the regulatory
reform is in Pombo (2001) and Interconexión-Eléctrica-S.A. (1995-1999)
5 For details of the privatization program in general and by sectors in Colombia, see Pombo and Ramírez (2003).8 PERFORMANCE AND EFFICIENCY IN COLOMBIA’S POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM: EFFECTS OF THE 1994 REFORM
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entry competition remain a pending and unfinished task in local power distribution. Finally, ISA
was split into two independent companies: ISA the Grid Company, and ISAGEN the publicly
owned enterprise that kept ISA's former power generation assets.6
TABLE 1
POWER DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSMISSION STRUCTURE
6 The 1995-1998 privatizations in Colombia implied a equity transfer of 48% for EEB, 65% in the case of CORELCA
in power distribution and transmission, and 56% for EPSA. The National Grid Company ISA sold 30% of its
equity through the stock market in 2000. ICEL is a holding of 14 regional power distribution companies, and
EMCALI is the power distribution company of the city of Cali see Pombo and Ramírez (2003).
The working dataset consists of 12 larger power distribution companies that belong to the
pre-reform regional electricity markets, which together compose the national interconnected
system. For each company we gathered information regarding the utility's financial state-
ments, number of users by category (i.e. residential, industrial, commercial, and official),
number of employees, power losses, sales, commercial demand, and final user tariffs for the
1985-2001 period.
Tables 2 and 3 report the main features of the panel structured dataset. First, the panel is
balanced. There are 17 observations for each EDC. For the case of EEB where the company
was broken in three independent enterprises, the series where chained with the power distri-
bution company -CODENSA- series after 1997. The privatization of CORELCA focused
on power distribution companies. Six regional power distributors companies were gathered
into two utilities, ELECTROCOSTA and ELECTRICARIBE, after 1998. Thus the series
Before Regulatory Reform  After Regulatory Reform 
Holding / Company  Generation  Transmission  Distribution  Holding / Company  Generation  Transmission  Distribution 
EEB x  x  x  EMGESA  x     
       EEB      x   
       CODENSA      x 
EPM x  x  x  EPM  x    x 
EMCALI     x  EMCALI      x 
ICEL x    x  ICEL  x    x 
CORELCA x  x  x  GENDELCA  x     
       TRANSELCA    x   
       ELECTRICARIBE      x 
       ELECTROCOSTA      x 
CVC x      EPSA  x     
ISA x  x    ISA   x   
       ISAGEN  x     
Source: CREGCARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 9
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were chained according to the post-privatization structure. Regarding the ICEL holding, its
utilities are still the same. The companies included in the study sample are: i) Centrales
Eléctricas del Cauca (CEDELCA), ii) Centrales Eléctricas de Nariño (CEDENAR), iii)
Centrales Eléctricas del Norte de Santander (CENS), iv) Central Hidroeléctrica de Caldas
(CHEC), v) Electrificadora de Santander S.A. (ESSA), vi) Electrificadora del Huila S.A.
(HUILA), and vii) Electrificadora del Tolima S.A. (TOLIMA).7 Finally, EPM and EMCALI
regional markets complete the study sample.
TABLE 2
STUDY SAMPLE - POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES
7 Each of the ICEL companies is a regional company likewise the Regional Electric Companies in the UK. Each
name is associated with one province of the country’s central regions. The ICEL companies excluded from the
study sample are: Empresa Antioqueña de Energía (EADE), Electrificadora de Boyacá (EBSA), Electrificadora del Caquetá
(CAQUETA), Electrificadora del Choco (CHOCO), Electrificadora del Meta (META), Empresa de Energia de Cundinamarca
(EEC). The exclusion of these EDC responds to several factors such as bad quality of the primary data, incomplete
series, and most important the unavailability to estimate the basic inputs like the number of transformers,
substations, and the distribution network extension necessary to perform a DEA exercise.
Before Privatization/Reform  After Privatization/Reform  Regional 
Market  Acronym  Utility Name  Acronym  Utility Name 
EEB  EEB  Empresa de Energia de Bogota  CODENSA  CODENSA S.A. ESP 
EPM  EPM  Empresas Publicas de Medellin  EPM  Empresas Publicas de Medellin 
CVC  EMCALI  Empresas Municipales de Cali  EMCALI  Empresas Municipales de Cali E.S.P 
ELECTRANTA  Electrificadora del Atlantico 
ELECTROCESAR  Electrificadora del Cesar 
GUAJIRA  Electrificadora de la Guajira 
ELECMAG  Electrificadora del Magdalena 
ELECTRICARIBE  Electrificadora del Caribe S.A. E.S.P 
ELECTROBOL  Electificadora de Bolivar S.A 
CORDOBA  Electrificadora del Cordoba S.A 
CORELCA 
SUCRE  Electrificadora de Sucre S.A. 
ELECTROCOSTA  Electrificadora de la Costa Atlantica S.A. 
E.S.P. 
CEDELCA  Centrales Eléctricas del Cauca  CEDELCA  Centrales Eléctricas del Cauca S.A E.S.P 
CEDENAR  Centrales Eléctricas de Nariño  CEDENAR  Centrales Eléctricas de Nariño S.A E.S.P 
CENS 
Centrales Eléctricas Norte de 
Santander  CENS 
Centrales Eléctricas Norte de Santander S.A. 
E.S.P 
CHEC  Central Hidroelectrica de Caldas  CHEC  Central Hidroelectrica de Caldas S.A E.S.P 
ELECTOLIMA  Electrificadora del Tolima  TOLIMA  Electrificadora del Tolima S.A E.S.P 
ESSA  Electrificadora de Santander S.A  ESSA  Electrificadora de Santander S.A E.S.P 
ICEL 
HUILA  Electrifidadora del Huila S.A  HUILA  Electrifidadora del Huila S.A E.S.P 
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Second, the study sample is representative due to its high share within the entire power sector.
The sample represents on average 54% of commercial demand, 75% of total customers, 70% of
industry direct employment, and around 80% of industry fixed assets value. Before the reform the
last indicator exhibit lower levels because the vertically integrated structure of the companies, while
after 1998 integrated utilities have to keep separate records by business activity. The study sample
share on the industry has increased over time and has become more representative of the industry.
TABLE 3
STUDY SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS BY PERIOD
Notes: Value series in millions of current pesos
Source: FEN (1996), SIVICO (1997-2001)
2.2 DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
The general approach to measure firm productive efficiency is through non-parametric lin-
ear programming Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) algorithm. The basic intuition in the mea-
surement of a plant productive efficiency from DEA estimation is the following: consider a set
of plants that use different combinations of inputs to produce a given unit of an homogeneous
output (electricity fits concept). If every plant is producing efficiently, all are in best practice
isoquant. In the case that one plant is demanding more inputs in order to produce that unit of
output, we are able to say that the plant is inefficient relative to the best practice isoquant.
DEA uses a sequence of linear programming problems to construct the best practice (cost
or production) frontier for a given a technology, in order to compute efficiency measures.
Technical inefficiency is measured as the ratio of the radial distance from the origin to the
combination of input usage in an input space and the radial distance from the origin to the
frontier or best practice frontier, which is built from the input combinations of the remaining
group of firms which are considered efficient (i.e. pair wise input - one output in an Cartesian
plane). This ratio will take a value between zero and one. If a plant has an efficiency score of
1, it is technically efficient. If the score is less than 1 then the plant is inefficient. For in-
  Number of Employees  Commercial Demand (GWh) 
Periods  Industry Sample  Sample  Share  Industry Sample  Sample  Share 
1985-1989  21,253 17,000  0.7999  29,302 17,533  0.5985 
1990-1993  22,245 18,213  0.8197  34,755 21,218  0.6109 
1994-1997  20,866 16,456  0.7882  42,250 22,872  0.5435 
1998-2001  15,043 10,984  0.7275  42,863 24,014  0.5607 
Average  19,852 15,663  0.7084  37,292 21,409  0.5318 
  Number of Users  Total Fixed Assets  (Millions $) 
Periods  Industry Sample  Sample  Share  Industry Sample  Sample  Share 
1985-1989  4,121,812 3,198,773  0.7766  1,875,327 1,199,751  0.6398 
1990-1993  5,345,779 4,095,942  0.7663  5,166,010 3,642,329  0.7051 
1994-1997  6,503,943 4,996,946  0.7682  9,653,314 7,715,436  0.7993 
1998-2001 7,837,579  6,005,516  0.7667  16,666,786  14,372,504  0.8623 
Average  5,952,278 4,574,294  0.7572  7,854,235 6,325,275  0.8053 CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 11
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stance if plant B has a score of 0.8 and plant A has a score of 1, given they are over the same
radial measure of efficiency, plant B is 20% inefficient relative to the production frontier and
Firm A. That is, if plant B uses its inputs as plant A, then she would increase its output in
20%. This measurement is called non-parametric input-oriented efficiency scores.8
The advantages and disadvantages of using DEA over stochastic estimation in frontier analysis
to measure efficiency are well known in the literature.9 Specifically in our work, DEA suits our
needs of efficiency estimation against stochastic frontier (SF) for several reasons. First, DEA is
directly aimed to frontier and efficiency estimation, rather than a central or biased tendency as in SF
measures. Second, there is no a priory assumption on the analytic form of the production function.
Third, is suitable for measuring technical efficiency in multi-input/output production process. Forth,
allows the use of environmental variables or variables not directly included into the production
function but have effects on the input/output usage. Fifth, the determination of type of returns
and its effect on efficiency is straightforward. But also DEA imposes some shortcomings in our
work. First, DEA results are sensitive to errors in the data, inclusion and exclusion of observations
and variables, and model specification. Second, the relationship among the number of units as-
sessed and the number of input/output variables used, also have influence on the efficiency results.
These disadvantages of the methodology are addressed in different ways in our study.
On the other hand, stochastic frontiers allow for an error term in the measurement of effi-
ciency and assume a specific functional form for the underlying technology. This last feature
becomes important when the Decision Making Unit (DMU) is a profit maximizing unit and the
researcher knows input prices in order to estimate plant overall economic efficiency. A stochas-
tic error also becomes important when output or productivity is subject to external shocks.
There are different problems in using stochastic frontiers. First, efficiency scores are sensitive
to the assumption regarding the distributional form of the error term (Green (1980)). Second,
the usage of flexible production/cost functions, which might approximate a flexible technol-
ogy, is costly in terms of degrees of freedom and the large number of parameters needed in the
maximum likelihood function. Third, comparing with DEA, the error term usually “absorbs”
most of the inefficiency leaving few magnitudes attributable to pure technical inefficiency.
Finally, stochastic frontiers does not allow for multiple efficient firms as DEA does, leaving no
space for idiosyncratic differences that may suggest two different firms are efficient given its
own characteristics (Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998)).
2.3 MALMQUIST PRODUCTIVITY INDEX
One advantage of our data is that given its panel structure allows us to undertake productivity
analysis by means of Malmquist productivity indices (MPI). Figure 1 illustrates the case when there
is a productivity improvement without technological change, in an input oriented sense; this is
input reduction given an output level. We have an efficient frontier made up of efficient combina-
8  The literature of DEA as well as their applications is extensive. The following references provide a good introduc-
tion and reviews on the topic: Fried, et al. (1993), Coelli, et al. (1998), and Thanassoulis (2001).
9 For a basic discussion of the issue see Pollit (1995) and Coelli, et al. (1998). Further evidence on the estimation of
frontier analysis, arguments for and against see Byrnes, et al. (1986), Sengupta (1987), Seiford and Thrall (1990) and
Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998).12 PERFORMANCE AND EFFICIENCY IN COLOMBIA’S POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM: EFFECTS OF THE 1994 REFORM
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tions of inputs  1,2 X  by firms  A to E Technical inefficiency in time t for DMU  t G  is given by the
ratio of the radial distances OU  and  t OG , and in time  1 t +  is given by the ratio of OV  and
1 t OG + ; where U  and V  are the hypothetical input combinations that would make DMU G effi-
cient for in each period considered.10  Change in the productivity index is the ratio of both measures











Firm productivity change under this setup is equal to the shift on the radial distance from
period t to  1 t + , reflecting the fact that new input combinations can eliminate technical ineffi-
ciency.
Following the case for no technological change, Figure 2 illustrates the case when there is
technological change, implied by the shift in the production frontier from  0 Q  to  1 Q . MPI for
DMU G  is written as the geometric mean of productivity or input usage evolution in each
period. First against  t Q  and then against  1 t Q + , as the ratio of the corresponding measures
MPI is defined as the geometric mean of both effects.
FIGURE 1
PRODUCTIVITY INDEX FOR THE CASE OF NO TECHNICAL CHANGE
10 Formally this is the assumption that there is a convex combination of production plans that also belongs to the
constructed production set; a mathematical and economic assumptions for DEA estimation. A detailed presenta-
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FIGURE 2
PRODUCTIVITY INDEX FOR THE CASE OF TECHNICAL CHANGE
Source: (Thanassoulis, 2001)
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(2)
Equation (2) can be written as Equation (3). In this formulation the MPI is decomposed in two
terms where an industry level productivity change is observed, called “boundary shift effect”11
and firm level productivity change, called “catch-up effect” . The first one shows the radial dis-
tance between the frontiers from period t to  1 t + . The second component shows the radial
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11 Our presentation of MPI is taken from Thanassoulis (2001) and Coelli, et al. (1998). A formal derivation of the MPI
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Following the interpretation of Färe, et al. (1994), equation (3) says that changes in productiv-
ity at firm/DMU level are the cross product of gains in productive efficiency relative to industry's
benchmark and, a technical change component as a result of innovation. Equation (3) is imple-
mented in our DEA's measurement exercises straightforward under a constant returns to scale,
input-oriented linear programming setup. Equation (2) implies four linear programming programs
with respect to periods t and  1 t +  for each DMU: i) two linear programming problems regarding
their own time-frontiers and ii) two linear programming models crossing time frontiers.12
3. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND DEA MEASURES
3.1 NON-PARAMETRIC TESTS ON FINANCIAL INDICATORS
This section reports the results on performance for the power distribution companies and
the measurements of efficiency scores across them. The first exercise relies on testing struc-
tural changes in means and medians before and after the reform for each performance indicator.
The analysis follows the approach of firm assessment used in privatization and ownership
studies such as Megginson, et al. (1994), La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) and Dewenter
and Malestra (2001) who focuses on utilities' direct measures of profitability, efficiency, assets
and investments, and sales before and after changes on ownership. The changes in means pro-
vide the direction of the effect the reform might have caused on firm performance. Changes in
medians indicate how successful the reform was. From the statistical point of view the idea is
to study the reform as an experiment where the year 1994 is a breaking point applied to matched
samples, and test the null hypothesis if the reform was effective. This test is non-parametric
because the data is ordered according to events belonging to individuals from different groups.
Hence, the experiment is considered effective if the observed change is statistically robust and
matches the expected one. The dataset is a balanced panel of the 12 utilities for the 1985-2001
period with 108 and 96 observations (N) before and after the reform, respectively.
Table 4 reports the results of the raw data and adjusted indicators.13 The latter are ratios
relative to EPM indicators. EPM was chosen as the control group since historically it has been
the most efficient utility nationwide, making it an appropriate benchmark.14 Several comments
result from the raw indicators measures. First, there is general improvement in the profitability
indicators. The mean (median) of net income to sales ratio rose from -11% (-2.4%) to 4.2%
(3.5%) after the reform. That increase was sharper if one considers fixed capital returns. The
mean (median) of operating income to PPE ratio increases from 40% (23%) to 51% (45%), and
the mean (median) of operating income to net worth rose from 56% (33.6%) to 81% (48.7%).
The above changes were significant at 1% percent levels.
Second, the performance in operating efficiency mirrors the profitability indicators. For in-
stance, the mean (median) of sales to plant, property and equipment (PPE) ratio grew 43%
12 For more details see Thanassoulis (2001).
13  Appendix 1 reports the definition and methodology of each indicator.
14 The reported DEA efficiency scores in the section also prove that EPM is a proper benchmark because its input-
output allocations are on the production frontier.CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 15
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(67%) after the reform, and the sales to employee ratio changed in 65% (75%). The above
changes are significant at 1% levels. Therefore, profitability gains are explained by the better
performance in operative efficiency. There were several sources that might have had an in-
fluence on such result, such as the reform and the new regulation requiring utilities to fulfill
financial, efficiency, and quality service targets. In particular, since 1995 the regulatory com-
mission has annually set directions to improve utility performance. The covered time span
after the reform for the study sample, allows us to assert that plant restructuring has taken
place in those companies that underwent such processes. The most noticeable cases of firm
restructuring were the privatization of the CORELCA holding and the EEB that took place
from 1996 to 1998.15
Employment cuts and new investment were not sources of operative efficiency gains
according to the results reported in Table 4. The mean (median) of total employment de-
creased 15% (16.5%) after the reform that is an average of 2.1% per year. The average plant
size moved from 835 employees per utility before the reform to 718 employees after the
reform. The mean (median) of capital stock, which is proxied by each utility PPE, increased
on average in 8% (16%) after the reform that is equivalent to a growth rate of 1% (2%) per
year.16 The PPE to labor ratio also exhibited a positive change. Nonetheless, the above changes
were not statistically significant.
Third, final sales pushed labor as well as capital productivity. The three output indicators
show important improvements. The mean (median) of total sales at constant 1998 prices grew
50% (41.5%) implying an annual rate of 6.3% (5.2%) per year. Total sales in GWh increases by
2.8% per year after 1994 and sales to residential users did so at 3.2% per year. The above
changes are significant at 1% and 10% levels. The above outcome was not induced by an
increase on aggregate commercial electricity demand, which experienced a slowdown after 1995.17
The effect came from a reduction in the non-technical losses, which implied better invoicing
and tariff collection processes by the utilities. The average change in the technical loss index
was 1.7 points after the reform. However, if one considers the three largest utilities there is an
effective reduction of 1.5 points in the loss indices.18 The increase in residential tariffs also
contributed to boost the utilities' sales. The mean (median) increased by 33% (30%) in the post
reform period. That is an annual rate of 4.1% (3.7%). In contrast, there were no statistically
significant changes in industrial tariffs.
15 A complete efficiency analysis of the privatized power generation utilities is in Pombo and Ramírez (2003). The
main findings regarding the sources of efficiency gains until 1998 were: i) privatization induced new investment in
incumbent firms, ii) employments cuts were not significant, and iii) there were positive efforts in reducing power
losses.
16 There is a caveat to bear in mind concerning PPE series. The chain for EEB only accounted the power distribution
assets represented in the new company of CODENSA after 1997. We run a t-test and z-test without this utility and
the changes in means were positive (6%) but no statistically significant.
17 Total aggregate demand for electricity grew on average 5.2% per year for the 1985-1994 period, while for the 1995-
2001 period electricity demand grew on average at 1.3% per year.
18  They are EEB, EPM, EMCALI, which have an average market share of 62% within the study sample.16 PERFORMANCE AND EFFICIENCY IN COLOMBIA’S POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM: EFFECTS OF THE 1994 REFORM
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TABLE 4
TEST ON CHANGES IN PERFORMANCE: RAW AND ADJUSTED INDICATORS
   Non-adjusted  Adjusted 
  N  N  Mean before  Mean after  t-stat    N  N  Mean before  Mean after  t-stat     Variable 
  Before  After  Median before Median after  z-stat    Before  After  Median before Median after  z-stat    
I. Profitability                                        
Net Income / Sales    108  96  -0.1104  0.0416  -3.30  a 99  88  -0.6651  -0.0535 -3.557  a 
        -0.0239 0.0351  -2.45  a     -0.1998  0.0489  -2.395  a 
Operating income / PPE    108  96  0.3998  0.5140  -2.19  a 99  88  2.2791  3.6118 -3.374  a 
         0.2288  0.4515  -4.49  a     1.3208  2.6409  -4.704  a 
Operating income / Net Worth    108  96  0.5600  0.8185  -2.39  a 99  88  1.9047  6.1910 -4.139  a 
            0.3365  0.4874  -2.81  a        1.2121  2.8277  -6.743 a 
II. Operating Efficiency                            
Log (sales/PPE)    108  96  -1.2714  -0.8447  -4.24  a 99  88  0.7210  0.4547  4.300  a 
         -1.4748  -0.7956  -4.49  a     0.8374  0.4270 4.415  a 
Log (sales / employees)    108  96  4.7201  5.3771  -7.07  a 99  88  0.7740  0.8449 -4.910  a 
         4.5179  5.2698  -6.63  a     0.7512  0.8285  -5.294  a 
Loss index    108  96  0.2104  0.2270  -1.70  a 99  88  1.5934  1.6637 -0.891  c 
         0.1870  0.2199  -2.03  a     1.4343  1.5743  -0.866  c 
Loss  index1    27 24  0.1817  0.1750 1.60  b              
         0.1626  0.1593  1.36  c             
III. Labor                                        
Log (employees)     108  96  6.7273  6.5777  1.64  c 99  88  0.9505  0.9428  0.539  c 
IV. Assets                                        
Log (PPE)    108  96  12.7188  12.7995  -0.04  c 99  88  0.8527  0.8389  1.673  b 
         12.4484  12.6076  -0.28  c     0.8395  0.8362 1.653  b 
Log (PPE / Employees)     108  96  5.9915  6.2119  -1.13  c 99  88  0.7630  0.7504  1.395  c 
V. Output                                        
Log (Sales $)    108  96  11.4474  11.9549  -3.35  a 99  88  0.8696  0.8950 -2.202  a 
         11.3440  11.7588  -3.31  a     0.8635  0.8866  -2.293  b 
Log (Sales residential GWh)    108 96  6.1939  6.4528 -2.02  a 99  88  0.7990  0.8234 -1.495  b 
         5.9834  6.2610  -2.18  a     0.7724  0.8049  -1.732  b 
Log (Sales total GWh)    108 96  6.8552  7.0775 -1.55  b 99  88  0.8043  0.8147 -0.622  c 
            6.6472  6.9475  -1.74  b        0.7868  0.8076  -0.950 c 
VI.  Tariffs                           
Log Residential tariffs    108  96  4.1688  4.5052  -12.62 a 99  88  1.0409  1.0313  1.419  c 
         4.1758  4.4692  -10.33 a     1.0395  1.0318 2.025  a 
Log Industrial tariffs    108  96  4.8054  4.7924  0.40  c 99  88  1.0192  1.0550 -4.616  a 
            4.7858  4.7789  0.21  c        1.0138  1.0349  -3.895 a 
  Notes: a. significant at 5%, b. Significant at 10%, c. Non-significat significance
Value series are at 1998 prices and deflated by CPI
Loss index1: includes only the three larger systems: EEB/CODENSA, EPM, EMCALI
Includes the following 12 EDCs: CEDELCA, CENS, CEDENAR, CHEC, EPM, CODENSA/EEB, EMCALI,
ELECTROCOSTA,  ELECTRICARIBE, ESSA, HUILA, TOLIMA
Source: authors calculationsCARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 17
Julio de 2004
The industry-adjusted indicators show that profitability ratios improved. In most cases the
change of means and medians doubles with respect the control group. This outcome as well as the
improvement in the raw indicators suggests positive changes in managerial procedures oriented to
the financial recovery of the utilities. The adjusted indicators for operative efficiency exhibited
mixed results. On one hand the mean (median) capital productivity fell by -0.26% (-0.41%), but
on the other the mean and median of labor productivity increased both by 7% relative to EPM
after the reform. This finding suggests that EPM rationalized capital spending relative to their
competitors. Also the privatized utilities were either capitalized before or after the equity transfer
to private investors. For instance, the CORELCA subsidiaries were capitalized in 1997 by the
government before their privatization. This caused PPE real value to double by the end of 1998
in these utilities.19 The above changes were significant at 1 percent level. On the other hand, input
levels of capital stock, employment and capital-labor ratios did not experience structural changes
after the reform. The only significant change, at 10 percent level, was the mean of PPE level that
decreased from 0.85 to 0.83 relative to the control group.
Output and sales increased in all cases reflecting positive efforts in invoicing and tariff
collection. In particular, residential sales and total value sales gained on average 3 percentage
points relative to EPM’s indicators. Higher tariffs contributed partially to this result. The mea-
surements show that the mean (median) of the relative industrial tariff grew by 3.6% (2%) after
the reform. This change is significant at 1 percent.
Table 5 reports the average tariffs for industrial and residential users by each EDC. The
1994 reform changed the trend in pricing behavior. Industrial users are better off after the
reform. Prices dropped 24% since 1997, which is an annual average of 4.8% per year. This
outcome is the result of the setting up of the wholesale electricity market for contracts transac-
tions since mid 1995. Figure 3 describes residential and industrial tariffs and the series of
electricity contract mean prices.20 Residential users were affected by higher tariffs. The slope in
the tariff trend became steeper after 1996. Real tariffs rose on average at a rate of 10% per year
for the 1997-2001 period. The three largest utilities drove industry price setting. Among them it
is clear that the former EEB, did an effort to reduce industrial tariffs and non-technical power
losses. But on the other hand residential tariffs rose in 2.2 times after company's privatization in
1997.21 Some utilities that increased both tariffs steadily since 1985, turned out to be the bad
performers in terms of productive efficiency from the DEA analysis. The next section turns
attention to the analysis of technical efficiency and productivity measures for the 12 power
distribution companies under study.
19 ELECRICARIBE’s plant, property, and equipment rose from US$ 163 to US$ 308 millions in 1998 at constant
prices of that year. ELECTROCOSTA did from US$ 90 to US$ 302 millions.
20 Notice the U-shape of contract prices. The first generation of purchase power contracts had a time span from 3 to
5 years. Clearly the inflexion point in mid 1999 is a consequence of the renewal of former contracts, the end of the
second El Niño cycle of the nineties that shifted up spot prices up during 1997-1998, and the security deterioration
regarding transmission towers blow-ups. Those elements changed agent’s price expectations toward an increasing
trend in electricity prices.
21 The market share of EEB is on average 28% within the study sample and 15% with respect to nationwide
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TABLE 5
INDUSTRIAL AND RESIDENTIAL TARIFFS BY COMPANY AND FIVE-YEAR PERIODS
Sources; SINSE, CREG, SSPD
Notes: The largest utilities are EEB, EPM and EMCALI
3.2 DEA EFFICIENCY SCORES, MALMQUIST PRODUCTIVITY INDEX
AND POLICY EFFECTIVENESS
The measurement of technical efficiency for power distribution through non-parametric linear
programming poses the problem of defining correctly the production function characterization of
the electricity distribution industry; several studies on efficiency, performance and productivity in
electricity distribution tackle this problem classifying variables within inputs, output and environ-
mental variables. Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass (1992) do so using DEA to estimate Malmquist
Productivity indices in Sweden and Førsund and Kittelsen (1998) in Norway; Miliotis (1992)
uses DEA analysis to assess effects of policy and ownership in efficiency for Greece, as well as
Bagdadioglu, et al. (1996) for Turkey, Pacudan and de Guzman (2002) for the Philippines,
finally Agrell, et al. (2003) for Scandinavia offers a insightful discussion of DEA estimation for
electricity distribution.22
Looking for an appropriate definition of a DEA model for power distribution and in order to
obtain comparable results with the existing literature in the topic we have classified the vari-
ables into inputs, outputs and environmental ones following Neuberg (1977) and similar stud-
ies previously quoted. Several definitions of a proper DEA model for electricity distribution
can be formulated, ranging from the whole consideration of inputs/outputs/environmental
variables to simply defining as input the number of employees and output the number of cus-
22 Filippini, et al. (2004) undertakes a very similar study to ours using a stochastic frontier estimation.
Industrial Tariffs 
   CEDELCA  CEDENAR  CENS  CHEC  EEB  E-CARIBE  E-COSTA  EPM 
1985-90 120.7 118.1 94.8  91.6 191.8 134.0 126.3 109.2
1991-96 120.8 155.1 127.3  120.0 153.7 153.5 155.7 119.6
1997-01 143.2 191.5 112.4  89.3 114.0 118.0 113.4 85.9
 EMCALI ESSA  HUILA  TOLIMA  Three 
largest 
Weighted 
average  Price change   
1985-90 107.7 123.3 118.3  103.3 136.3 136.8   
1991-96 121.0 124.1 152.9  120.0 131.4 138.1 0.0096  
1997-01 88.2 115.4 141.1  101.4 96.0 105.5 -0.2359  
Residential Tariffs 
   CEDELCA  CEDENAR  CENS  CHEC  EEB  E-CARIBE  E-COSTA  EPM 
1985-90 69.1 59.7 63.1  55.1 55.6 71.0 70.4 54.4
1991-96 68.4 59.4 73.7  71.1 73.3 80.0 68.1 67.3
1997-01 89.3 96.5 101.9  95.2 163.0 95.5 89.6 83.1
 EMCALI ESSA  HUILA  TOLIMA  Three 
largest 
Weighted 
average  Price change   
1985-90 75.7 73.2 60.0  55.3 61.9 61.6     
1991-96 89.6 80.6 80.0  78.8 76.7 74.7 0.2120   
1997-01 92.3 100.4 99.8  107.5 112.8 111.5 0.4924   CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 19
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tomers, leaving the remaining variables exogenous to the utilities' output decision-making. The
dual classification input/output/environmental variables come along with a suitable character-
ization of the DMU functions. Focusing in electricity distribution if we take transformers and
length of the power line network as inputs, the assumption is that those are control variables
for each utility. In this industry the demand is endogenous to environmental variables such as:
geographical dispersion, topography, population density, urban migration; which determine the
utilities' new investment in power lines network, substations and transformers. Thanassoulis
(2001) discusses the selection of variables and the definition of the input/output/environ-
mental variables. In particular, he stresses that there must be some prior knowledge regarding
the utility's operational characteristics. DEA itself imposes a constraint on the formulation of
a final model, the use of a big number of inputs and outputs against a small number of DMU's
assessed will bring most of the DMUs into the frontier leaving few for efficiency evaluation.
Therefore, adopting a reduced model for efficiency assessment lowers the trade-off between
relative efficiency and number of DMUs.
Table 6 presents the distribution into input / output / environmental variables for the esti-
mated model. The output is represented by the energy sold in Gigawatts per hour (GWh), the
input variables are: labor proxied by the number of employees in power distribution and com-
mercialization, and capital proxied by number of transformers and length of the distribution



















































INDUSTRIAL, RESIDENTIAL TARIFFS AND ELECTRICITY CONTRACTS
(PESOS PER KWH AT 1998 PRICES)
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rely on backward series extrapolation.23 The environmental variables are utility exogenous vari-
ables such as regional per capita GDP, power generating capacity, number of customers, and
urban areas covered in Km2.
The data used in the DEA estimation comprised information for 12 DMUs in 17 years for a
total of 204 observations; this data structure suggests a broad spectrum of DEA estimations.
From estimating a year-by-year DEA  to a timeless estimation considering every observation as an
independent DMU, we call the former “cross-section DEA” and the latter a “pooled DEA”. Within
this range it is also possible to run what is known as “window DEA” which consist of several
DEA estimations which sample is defined by a growing or constant number of observations (keeping
a balanced sample of DMU assessed). In our estimations we chose the extreme possibilities in the
spectrum, that is the cross-section and the pooled DEA in order to avoid the issues of window
procedures in DEA outlined in Asmild, et al. (2004), specially for the following Malmquist
estimation.24As mentioned previously a small sample for cross-section DEA imposes limitations
to the methodology, this is why the cross section and pooled DEA offer a robustness test for our
results. Bauer, et al. (1998) propose six consistency conditions that efficiency measures derived
from different efficiency estimations should meet: i) Comparable distributional properties; ii) Similar
efficiency rankings; iii) Similar best and worst practice institutions; iv) Reasonable stability over
time estimation; v) Reasonable consistency with competitive conditions; vi) Reasonable consis-
tency with standard non-frontier measures. Except for condition 5 the estimation results shown
below meet these requirements comparing against different window and pooled DEA estimations
for the model proposed in Table 6 and against an additional model where the same variables were
used but the only variables classified as discretionary were employees and total customers.
TABLE 6
MODEL FOR DEA ESTIMATION IN POWER DISTRIBUTION
23 Appendix 2 explains the methodology and the base regression equations that supported the backward forecasts
applied to the number of transformers and power lines distance series.
24 The results for this additional estimation are quite similar to those presented here, for additional results and
consistency on Bauer, et al. (1998) check list see Taborda (2003).
25 We should recall that the expected technology in power distribution is a fixed coefficient constant return to scale
(CRTS) according to the peak-load model in Steiner (1957).
 Table 7 summarizes the results of the efficiency scores of the DEA estimation under con-
stant returns to scale and its decomposition into Variable Return to Scale (VRTS) and Scale
Efficiency (SE).25 This decomposition is useful to find if the scale of operation becomes a
source of inefficiency for the firms and is obtained from equation (4).
   Input  Output 
Discretionary variables  Employees in power distribution and commercialization  Total Sales (GWh) 
   Number Transformers  Total customers 
   Power Lines Network (Kms.)    
Environmental  Regional GDP per-capita  Urban area served 
   National installed capacity in electricity generation    
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CRTS VRTS SE =× (4)
Under the assumption of CRTS, DEA efficiency scores show that six out of the twelve
electricity distribution companies are totally efficient. The lowest efficiency score corresponds
to CHEC for 13 years and CEDELCA for 3 years. For the period under study four utilities
exhibit VRTS meaning that they could reduce technical inefficiency through internal scale econo-
mies by means of an increase in sales, customers or in area served. Four utilities present serious
technical inefficiencies in power distribution according to these measurements: CEDELCA,
CHEC, ESSA and HUILA, which exhibit decreasing trends. Moreover, their efficiency scores
worsened after the reform. CEDELCA and CHEC ended up on average with scores equal or
less than 40% in 2001, while ESSA and HUILA exhibited efficiency scores of 57% and 65%
respectively. Such inefficiency is reflected by an operative scale problem illustrated by the scale
efficiency parameter that by 2001 three of them had scales below of 71%. Those are utilities
that serve medium-sized cities with low population density. In addition, these utilities show on
average high financial and operating costs, high levels of non-technical losses in power distri-
bution, and contraction in their regional per-capita consumption of electricity relative to the
benchmark utilities.26 On the other hand, ELECTROCOSTA was only the case that showed an
efficiency improvement after its privatization in 1997 reaching efficiency scores of 1.
For yardstick regulation purposes (Shleifer (1985)), DEA output also suggests the frontier ref-
erence DMU(s) the inefficient DMU should mimic in order to become efficient. We will concen-
trate in the EDC that are stable frontier reference DMUs, which are several continuous years as
reference DMU for the group of inefficient ones. EEB stand as a reference benchmark for all the
inefficient EDC, specifically for ESSA, CHEC and HUILA for 14, 15 and 16 years, respectively;
while EPM is reference for CEDELCA, CHEC, and ESSA for 7, 7 and 5 years, respectively.
Finally, ELECTRICARIBE is reference for Huila, ESSA and CENS for 16, 16 and 8 years
Productivity measurement is carried out by means of Malmquist productivity indices (MPI),
which complements the DEA efficiency analysis. According to equation (2). The measurement
of efficiency scores for two-year periods across the sample of DMUs will yield three types of
firms. The firs type, are the efficient DMUs in period t and  1 t +  who remain on the frontier.
Their radial distance for each period will be equal to 1, there is no gain in “catch-up effect” but
its productivity gain is reflected through the industry's boundary displacement or “boundary
effect”. The second type are non efficient firms in both periods, but for period  1 t +  their inef-
ficiency has been reduced, those firms are experiencing both effects, catch-up and boundary
productivity improvements, they are closing their distance against the frontier in time  1 t +  and
at the same time are moving along with the frontier. Finally there is a third group of firms who
lost relative efficiency at time  1 t + , from its observed efficiency level observed in t. Figure 4
and Table 8 report the results of the Malmquist productivity decomposition. For each utility
the MPI is estimated by equation (2) based on the cross-section DEA estimations. The table
26 The privatization process had a sudden stop in 1999. Private investors have not been interested in the former ICEL
subsidiaries (CEDELCA, CEDENAR, CENS, CHEC, ESSA, HUILA, and TOLIMA) and EMCALI due to their
long-term financial, labor and pension liabilities. Sector authorities have stressed the financial problem and the call
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TABLE 7
DEA EFFICIENCY SCORES - POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES
presents the average for two sub-periods, emphasizing the turning point created by the 1994
reform. The last two columns report the average of the 12 utilities under study, and the cumu-
lative MPI indices that reflect the evolution of productivity levels across time.27
Three main comments arise from this exercise. First, the utilities used as benchmarks in the
DEA analysis show small or negligible changes in their MPI indices. This is the case of EEB, EPM,
EMCALI, ELECRICACARIBE, and TOLIMA.28 Every year these utilities are on the production
27 We choose to estimate year-by-year Malmquist index in order to avoid the problems related with Malmquist
decomposition into catch up and boundary effects outlined in Asmild, et al. (2004).
28 The former three are the largest power distributors nationwide with an average market share above 60% within the
study sample. They are the electricity distributors of the three largest cities in the country: Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali.
Constant Returns to Scale 
    1986-1987 1988-1989 1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 
CEDELCA  0.71 0.76 0.87 0.78 0.72 0.58 0.67 0.34 
CEDENAR  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CENS  1.00 0.83 1.00 0.89 0.85 0.92 0.96 1.00 
CHEC  0.55 0.56 0.62 0.49 0.45 0.52 0.40 0.40 
EEB  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ELECTRICARIBE  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ELECTROCOSTA  0.91 0.96 1.00 0.97 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EMCALI  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EPM  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ESSA  0.84 0.79 0.89 0.84 0.82 0.72 0.59 0.57 
HUILA  0.91 0.72 0.92 0.83 0.69 0.92 0.69 0.65 
TOLIMA  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Variable Returns to Scale 
CEDELCA  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.99 
CEDENAR  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CENS  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CHEC  0.55 0.57 0.64 0.50 0.45 0.53 0.48 0.56 
EEB  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ELECTRICARIBE  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ELECTROCOSTA  0.97 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EMCALI  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EPM  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ESSA  0.86 0.79 0.89 0.84 0.82 0.73 0.61 0.66 
HUILA  0.97 0.80 1.00 0.89 0.77 1.00 0.94 1.00 
TOLIMA  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Scale efficiency 
CEDELCA  0.71 0.76 0.87 0.78 0.72 0.62 0.67 0.35 
CEDENAR  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CENS  1.00 0.83 1.00 0.89 0.85 0.92 0.96 1.00 
CHEC  1.00 1.00 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.84 0.71 
EEB  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ELECTRICARIBE  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ELECTROCOSTA  0.94 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EMCALI  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EPM  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ESSA  0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.87 
HUILA  0.93 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.74 0.65 
TOLIMA  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  Source: authors’ calculation
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frontier and are the source behind overall efficiency boundary shifts. On average, boundary changes
were 4.8% per year after the reform in contrast to the 3.2% average for the pre-reform period.
Second, there were no improvements in the utilities' efficiency catch-up. Except for one case, all
non-benchmark DMUs exhibit values less than one, meaning that those utilities are farther from
their boundary after the reform. Third, the source of productivity is mainly driven from the sharp
increase observed in the boundary effect after the reform. Moreover, the most inefficient utilities
present the higher boundary shifts rates after the reform. For instance, CEDELCA had a 23%
annual average boundary shift after 1995, followed ESSA with 13.8%, and HUILA with 7.7%.
The above findings confirm that there were important productivity gains in the power distri-
bution system after the 1994 regulatory reform, explained by a strong and positive evolution of
the largest utilities placing a veil of good indicators over the less efficient firms. The above
results are conclusive in the direction that the overall gain in productive efficiency came from
changes from the benchmark utilities and there was no effort for low performers to catch-up to
the industry's average efficiency levels; basically the same result observed in performance analysis
where big EDC outperformed over the sample. The assessment of policy effectiveness is an
important issue analyzing competition policy and market reforms. DEA allows evaluating effi-
ciency within a group of DMU's working under different policy regimes.
TABLE 8
MALMQUIST PRODUCTIVITY DECOMPOSITION BY POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPANY
Total Malquist Index 




1987-1994  1.075 1.001  1.050  1.057  1.000  1.000  1.021  1.002  1.000  1.063  1.050  1.000  1.027  109.183 
1995-2000  1.050 1.000  1.044  1.051  1.001  1.000  1.019  1.000  1.005  1.056  1.050  1.000  1.023  130.793 
Average  1.064 1.001  1.048  1.054  1.001  1.000  1.020  1.001  1.002  1.060  1.050  1.000  1.025  118.445 
Std deviation  0.088  0.003  0.071  0.079  0.002  0.000  0.034  0.005  0.008  0.097  0.099  0.000  0.027  13.564 
Boundary shift 




1987-1994  1.077 1.001  1.065  1.081  1.000  1.000  1.012  1.002  1.000  1.067  1.082  1.000  1.032  110.204 
1995-2000  1.230 1.000  1.028  1.087  1.001  1.000  1.011  1.000  1.005  1.138  1.077  1.000  1.048  145.399 
Average  1.143 1.001  1.049  1.084  1.001  1.000  1.012  1.001  1.002  1.097  1.080  1.000  1.039  125.287 
Std deviation  0.286  0.003  0.096  0.134  0.002  0.000  0.021  0.005  0.008  0.138  0.178  0.000  0.063  23.247 
Catch-up 




1987-1994  1.007 1.000  0.996  0.987  1.000  1.000  1.009  1.000  1.000  1.003  0.986  1.000  0.999  100.717 
1995-2000  0.948 1.000  1.022  0.980  1.000  1.000  1.008  1.000  1.000  0.948  0.999  1.000  0.992  97.452 
Average  0.982 1.000  1.007  0.984  1.000  1.000  1.009  1.000  1.000  0.979  0.992  1.000  0.996  99.318 
Std deviation  0.242  0.000  0.118  0.120  0.000  0.000  0.039  0.000  0.000  0.140  0.160  0.000  0.046  4.710 
  Source: Author’s calculation
Notes: Before the reform period = 1987-1994; after the reform period = 1995-2000. MPI = Malmquist productivity
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The procedure is called by Thanassoulis (2001) as “disentangling managerial and policy
efficiency”, an application of the work of Charnes, et al. (1981); which implies a window DEA
analysis for two periods chosen on the change of regulation and industry structure. From a
benchmarking regulation perspective, disentangling managerial effect from the regulatory ef-
fect becomes a useful and innovative application of the methodology to assess policy effec-
tiveness, in our case to assess regulatory change on public utilities.29
The intuition behind disentangling managerial from policy efficiency is to separate the
effects induced in efficiency from variables directly related to the DMU's activity from idio-
syncratic variables affecting the industry, in our case the introduction of a new industry and
regulatory framework. In order to apply the procedure we have defined two policy groups,
according to the pre and post reform periods, all the estimations were done grouping the data
in a “pooled DEA” in order to introduce the changes in the industry as a policy for a homoge-
neous set of firms.30 The approach involves a two-step procedure. The first stage consists in
obtaining DEA efficiency scores for each policy group (pre and post reform). Therefore,
each inefficient DMU in each policy group is brought to the frontier using the feasible com-
bination of inputs that would take them to become totally pareto efficient. In the first stage
we have observed inefficiency for DMU into its policy group and then we have eliminated
the inefficiency concerning the management under the specific policy, in our case the
inefficiency under pre and post regulatory reform assigned to management of EDC. Afterwards
the second step starts by pooling all units from both policies, and run a new DEA. Any
inefficiency scores obtained is attributable to the corresponding policy. Summing up, at the
first stage managerial inefficiency is eliminated by taking all units under a specific policy to
the frontier, at the second stage policy inefficiency is observed given that there is no other
source, besides that the DMU's are working under a new set of constraints, i.e. new regulatory
and industry structure.
Table 9 summarizes the results of this exercise, which are very consistent with those re-
ported in our performance, efficiency and productivity analysis. It is undeniable the positive
effect on efficiency because the reform reducing drastically any remaining inefficiency. Accord-
ing to Table 9, nine out of twelve utilities reduced, on average, 6 points its inefficiency because
of the reform. The remaining units stayed fairly constant. Again we have a set of EDC which
efficiency was strongly and positively affected by regulatory reform, while the already efficient
ones kept its position.
The next section turns attention to modeling efficiency scores under constant and variable
return to scale as functions of utility characteristics, ownership structure, and regulatory policy
variables for the study sample of power distribution companies.
29 To the best of our knowledge there are no available studies using this procedure to assess the effectiveness of
regulatory change on public utilities. For a discussion of choosing the window length in DEA, see Asmild,
et al. (2004).
30 In other words, data is staked according to firm-year observations for each of one the 12 utilities before and after
1995, although the reform was introduced in 1994, we moved the breaking date to 1995 in order to allow for one
year of accommodation in the behavior of the EDC and the implementation of the pool market for electricity.CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 25
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FIGURE 4


















MPI Boundary-Shift effect Catch-up effect
Source: Authors' calculations based on inputs/output and environmental variables dataset used in Table 7
TABLE 9
MANAGERIAL AND REGULATORY POLICY EFFICIENCY
Policy inefficiency    
   1986-1994 1995-2001 
CEDELCA 1.0000  0.9988 
CEDENAR 1.0000  0.9976 
CENS 0.9353  0.9733 
CHEC 0.8782  0.9790 
EEB 0.9638  0.9827 
ELECTRICARIBE 0.9979  0.9998 
ELECTROCOSTA 0.8590  0.9811 
EMCALI 0.9293  0.9961 
EPM 0.9561  0.9824 
ESSA 0.8486  0.9775 
HUILA 0.9991  1.0000 
TOLIMA 0.9957  0.9871 
Industry average  0.9469  0.9880 
Source: Authors’ calculations
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4. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENCY SCORES
This section reports the results of the econometric analysis performed on the DEA effi-
ciency scores from the pooled DEA sample.31 The analysis follows a limited dependent variable
model given that the dependent variable under analysis is censored by construction. It takes
positive values and is bounded at 1; that is, the efficient plants will record an efficiency score













The residuals are I.I.D following a normal distribution with zero mean and constant variance.
Equation (5) models efficiency scores as a function of utility characteristics, performance,
environmental, ownership structure, and regulatory-related policy dummies. Plant characteristics
include indicators of input-intensity given by sales in GWh to transformers or power lines length
ratios, while the log of plant, property, and equipment (PPE) controls for plant size. Two variables
controlling for plant efficiency were included. The first one is either the loss index or the industry-
adjusted loss index. As mentioned before, this is a standard indicator for efficiency in power
distribution. The greater are the power losses, the higher is the utility's technical inefficiency. The
second variable is the log of sales to PPE ratio, which controls for utility capital productivity.
Several performance variables were considered. Among them are variables on profitability and
sales diversification given by the industrial-to-residential sales ratio.32 The expected sign for those
is positive since profitability channels new investment and leads to increases in industrial sales,
which cover the utility against the risk of bad debtors within the residential sector in the regulated
market. The indicators of covered urban area and number of subscribers per Km2 control for
market density. Those are environmental variables within the context of power distribution activity.
The expected sign of these variables is positive because greater density allows the utility to exploit
its network's economies of scale. A set of dummies completes the model. The dummies capture
the implementation of regulatory reform, ownership structure, and business activity. As mentioned
before, some power distribution companies are still integrated with power generation activities,
while others became completely specialized after privatization.
Table 10 displays the main results regarding the determinants of DEA efficiency scores under
constant return to scale assumption and scale efficiency defined in Equation 4. The first three
columns depict the efficiency scores OLS regression pooled equations. The fifth column reports
the Tobit pooled regression based on the specification of regression equation 3, which reports
normal residuals with constant variances. This condition is fundamental for getting unbiased and
efficient coefficients in the Tobit regressions. Regression equation 6 presents the Tobit-random
31 This is a “pooled DEA” instead of a “window DEA” analysis as the one presented in Section 3.2, we do so in order
to allow comparable conclusions with the policy analysis presented en the previous section were time dimension
was not used.
32 One can argue that utilities are profitable due to the exercise of monopoly power.  Nonetheless, under price-cap
regulation profitability increases are sustained by efficiency gains.CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 27
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effects panel specification, which controls for unobservable individual characteristics through the
specific component vi of the residual, which is different for each individual (utility) in the panel.
The reading of those results is as follows. First, the model has a good fit explaining from
75% to 85% the efficiency scores. The independent variables are in all cases statistically signifi-
cant and show the expected sign, except for the industry adjusted loss index.33 Second, effi-
ciency scores are positively related to input intensity and plant size indicators. In particular, a
10% increase in physical sales to transformers will raise efficiency scores on an average of
14%, while a 10% increase in the log of PPE will raise technical efficiency in 0.9%. Third, the
effect of performance indicators is mixed. On one side, increases in utility capital return will
boost efficiency. For instance, a 10% increase in operative income to net worth ratio will im-
prove efficiency on average in 0.45%. On the other side, the industry-adjusted loss index dis-
plays the opposite sign.34 This result might be influenced by the fact that some utilities that
were considered as benchmarks did not show improvements in their power losses indices dur-
ing the time span.35 Fourth, density variables turned out to be significant. An increase in 100
Km2 in the urban area served will boost efficiency on average in 0.018%. Fifth, regulatory
policy had positive effects on utility efficiency. Disregarding the estimation method the regres-
sion coefficients show on average an overall efficiency gain of 5%, the same type of result
obtained in the policy efficiency exercise performed in previous section. In contrast, the busi-
ness dummy that captures whether a utility is still integrated or fully specialized in power distri-
bution, has a negative effect. The result is consistent across regressions. On average, there was
an overall efficiency loss of 10% from not being fully specialized.
The scale efficiency regressions were not as robust as the efficiency scores ones. We were
not able to find an equation without residuals with increasing variance. Therefore, we limited
the analysis to OLS robust regression. The explanatory factors are almost the same as those
just discussed. The model explains 78% of utility scale efficiency. Two additional variables
turned out to be important. One is the loss index that shows up with the expected sign, 10%
increase in power losses coefficient will deteriorate utility efficiency scale in 6.5%. The other
is capital productivity, 10% increase in the log of sales to PPE ratio will raise scale efficiency
in 0.9%. In sum, productive efficiency responds to the proposed model where micro vari-
ables seem very important in explaining its behavior, and understanding the role of regula-
tory policy and exogenous factors that currently have a direct effect on overall efficiency in
urban power distribution.
33 In addition there is no collinearity problem across regressors according to the mean of the variance inflation factor
(VIF) statistic.
34 The adjusted index says that if there is an improvement in reducing the non-technical losses with respect to the
control group (EPM) it has to converge to 1. If the adjusted index increases means that power losses worsen
relative to EPM’s.
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TABLE 10
EFFICIENCY SCORES AND PLANT SCALE DETERMINANTS
OLS Pooled  Tobit -Pooled  Tobit-Panel-RE 
ES-CRTS   ES-CRTS    ES-CRTS    Scale  efficiency1   ES-CRTS  ES-CRTS  
  
Variable 
   Eq 1    Eq 2    Eq 3    Eq 4    Eq 5    Eq 6   
Sales-GWh / Transf  1.2458  a 1.4584 a 1.403 a 1.0415 a 1.7976 a 0.4966 a 
    (0.0913)   (0.0686)  (0.0714)   (0.0561)   (0.1117)  (0.0893)  
Sales-GWh / Lines  0.2878  a 0.2115 a 0.2305 a    0.202  a 0.2135 a 
    (0.2878)   (0.0248)  (0.0257)      (0.0307)  (0.0181)  
Subcribers per  Km2  7.3E-05  a              
    (9.1E-06)               
Urban Area (Km2)      2.04E-05  a 1.72E-05 a 1.56E-05 a 2.14E-05 a   
       (2.9E-06)  (3.1E-06)   (1.97E-06)   (3.82E-06)       
Ind-sales / Res-sales  0.1106  b              
    (0.0517)               
Log PPE      0.0938  a 0.0983 a 0.1062 a 0.1056 a 0.0783 a 
       (0.0079)  (0.0081)   (0.0066)   (0.0091)  (0.0057)  
Log (sales/PPE)              0.0908  a     
            (0.0312)       
Oper-Income / Net Worth  0.0246  c 0.0218 c 0.026 b    0.0433  b 0.0372 a 
    (0.0142)   (0.0124)  (0.0124)      (0.0198)  (0.0114)  
Loss Index              -0.6448  a     
            (0.1411)       
Loss Index-ad  0.1072  a    0.0456  a    0.0483  a 0.0391 a 
    (0.0234)       (0.0187)      (0.0213)  (0.0122)  
Dummy Regulation  0.0549  b 0.0601 a 0.0534 a 0.0595 a 0.0663 a 0.0563 a 
    (0.0218)   (0.0162)  (0.0164)   (0.0150)   (0.1844)  (0.0111)  
Dummy Business  -0.1384  a -0.1123 a -0.1251 a    -0.1172  a -0.0662 a 
    (0.0226)   (0.0195)  (0.0200)      (0.0221)  (0.0133)  
Constant  0.1647   -0.8199  -0.9357   -0.529   -1.0798  -0.50338   
Sigma                 0.1100       
Num  Obs  192   192  192   192   192  192  
R2-OLS  0.7659    0.8552    0.8597    0.7788       
Mean  VIF  1.50   1.46  1.61   1.59           
F-test  74.8   155.2  140.2   108.6           
    [0.0000]    [0.0000]    [0.0000]    [0.0000]       
LR-Chi2(k-1)                 372.2       
                   [0.0000]       
Uncensored Obs                  146       
Censored Obs                  46       
Wald-Chi2(k-1)                       704.7   
                       [0.0000]   
Num of groups                      12   
Obs per Group: (Min, Max)                      16,16   
Cook-Weisberg  -OLS  5.66   2.71  1.30   36.02           
    [0.0174]    [0.0996]    [0.2540]    [0.0000]       
Breuch  Pagan  -OLS  28.3   6.45  3.52   43.68           
    [0.0000]    [0.2643]    [0.7409]    [0.0000]       
swilk  -OLS  2.86   1.49  1.15   0.934           
    [0.0021]    [0.0669]    [0.1251]    [0.1751]       
LR Test on sm=0                     130.2   
Chi2(1)                     [0.0000]   
 
Notes: 1/ = White-Hubert robust standard errors; 2/= Weighted data. Analytical weights using residuals OLS
equation
Std errors appear in parentheses, and p-values in square brackets; a= significat at 1%, b= significant at 5%, c= significat
at 10%
Series definitions are in explained in Appendix 3 and in the text.CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 29
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V. C ONCLUSIONS
This paper has conducted an in-depth study of utility performance and technical efficiency
trends for a time span long enough to test performance, efficiency and productivity benefits in
power distribution of the 1994 reform in Colombia. Based on a sample of 12 utilities covering
the largest cities of the country and a time span of 16 years, the findings suggest that the recent
evolution in urban power distribution has improved during the post-reform years. The perfor-
mance exercise reported a recovery in profitability rates. This is partly explained by gains in
labor and capital productivity across companies, but higher residential tariffs also unbound
utility financial constraints. This result contradicts in some sense the public version of a struc-
tural financial crisis within power utilities. Nonetheless, the companies that are facing financial
problems respond to their own particular reasons.36
The efficiency analysis yields important outcomes. On one hand, the results of efficiency
trends across power distributors did not boost efficiency within the inefficient power distribu-
tors. Moreover, they became less efficient after 1995. However, the efficient distributors, which
are the larger utilities, remain on the best practice frontier. This trend is confirmed with the
Malmquist productivity indices. Efficiency gains relied on the boundary shifts rather than effi-
ciency catch up across utilities below the frontier. This implies that those plants are away from
the benchmark's Pareto efficient inputs allocation. The benefits of the reform are also ob-
served after disentangling managerial from policy efficiency. The inefficiency in the post-re-
form period, after have eliminated any managerial inefficiency in each policy group, is dramatically
lower than pre-reform period.
Finally the econometric exercise provides evidence regarding the determinants of efficiency
scores. They are influenced by firm characteristics such as plant size and factor intensities.
Market density has a positive effect on utility productive efficiency. Regulatory policy has had
positive effects on power distribution efficiency according to the regression equations. This
regulation dummy turned out to be a robust regressor that on average implied an efficiency gain
of 5% after the reform. This finding is consistent and goes in the same direction with previous
results of efficiency analysis in power generation for the case of Colombia reported in Pombo
and Ramírez (2003). The policy implications of the above results lie on the fact that ownership
does not guarantee itself efficiency improvements. The ownership dummy turned out to be a
non-significant explanatory variable. This finding is consistent with results found in other case
studies where there is no evidence of positive impact of private ownership in plant efficiency
in power generation and distribution, such as those reported in Pollit (1995).
36 For instance, Pombo and Ramírez (2003) document that profitability indicators did not increase among the priva-
tized power holdings keeping the pre-reform structure of integrated utilities in power generation, distribution and in
lesser degree transmission. The study concludes that such outcome is consequence of open market competition in
power generation. The former ICEL subsidiaries and EMCALI were not included in the above mentioned-study.30 PERFORMANCE AND EFFICIENCY IN COLOMBIA’S POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM: EFFECTS OF THE 1994 REFORM
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DEFINITIONS OF PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
Variable Description 
Profitability    
Net Income / Sales  Net income is equal to sales minus financial expenses plus other 
income. Sales are equal to the value of services sold. 
Operating income / PPE  Operating income equals sales. PPE stands for the value of the 
company fixed assets. 
Operating income / Net Worth  Operating income equals sales. Net worth is total assets plus 
additional income from shareholders and past income. 
Operating Efficiency    
Log (sales/PPE)  Sales are equal to the value of services sold. PPE stands for the 
value of the company fixed assets. 
Log (sales / employees)  Sales are equal to the value of services sold. Labor is the number of 
employees in distribution. 
Labor    
Log (employees)  Labor stands for the number of employees in distribution. 
Assets    
Log (PPE)  PPE stands for the value of the company fixed assets. 
Log (PPE / Employees)  PPE stands for the value of the company fixed assets. Labor stands 
for the number of employees in distribution. 
Output    
Log (Sales)  Value of electric energy sold to total users. 
Log (Sales residential)  GWh sold to residential users 
Log (Sales total)  GWh sold to total users (residential, industrial, commerce and 
government) 
Loss index  Percentage energy losses. Percentage of GWh entered in the grid 
system which did not reach final users for technical or billing 
reasons. 
Tariffs    
Residential tariffs  Energy price of sale to final residential users 
Industry  tariffs  Energy price of sale to final industry users. 
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APPENDIX 2
INPUT ESTIMATION IN POWER DISTRIBUTION
The original data provided by CREG on distribution net length and number of transformers
was incomplete (including data only for 1999, 2000 and 2001) and slightly inconsistent (in
some cases from year 2000 to 2001 the variables decreased instead of increase or remain con-
stant, a technical situation difficult to conceal in the electric energy distribution industry).
Given that the goal of the study is to compare information on distribution facilities before and
after the 1994 regulatory reform and that the rest of the information collected ranged from
1985 - 2001, we estimated in sample information for distribution net length and number of
transformers from econometric estimation on the available data for net and transformers.
The procedure for estimation of the missing data is based on determinants of the data
originally reported on net length and number of transformers, then from the parameters found
an in-sample backward forecasting is applied, in the cases were unreliable results were ob-
tained, no change was applied on the data and the last observation obtained was left for the
previous year. Table A2.1, shows the original information provided by CREG, the final data
obtained is available upon request.CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 35
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TABLE A2.1.
ORIGINAL INFORMATION PROVIDED BY CREG
Firm  Year  Transformers (number of)  Transmission net length (Km) 
CVC (VALLE)  2000  18470  7421 
CVC (VALLE)  2001  19881  7425 
CAQUETA 2001  1806  1543 
CEDELCA 2000  8330  4780 
CEDELCA 2001  8302  5181 
CEDENAR 2000 758  2538 
CEDENAR 2001 758  2538 
CENS 2000  4586  1361 
CENS 2001  8123  1430 
CHEC 2000  14691  7596 
CHEC 2001  15856  8198 
CHOCO 2001  909  798 
EADE 2001  14903  13353 
EDEQuindio 2001  5783  2231 
EEB 2001  48546  17098 
EPM_solo 2000  39460.0  5035.0 
EPM_solo 2001  43019.0  5040.0 
EMCALI 1999  15506  2187 
EMCALI 2000  15376  2183 
EPP 2000  4268 435 
EPP 2001  4281 436 
EPSA 2000  18470  7421 
EPSA 2001  19881  7425 
ESSA 2001  17290 9576 
HUILA 2001  6227  3731 
TOLIMA 2001  2022  804 
ELECTRICARIBE 2000  21105.0  6011.0 
ELECTRICARIBE 2001  21105.0  5968.0 
ELECTROCOSTA 2000  11843.0  9628.0 
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TABLE A2.2
REGRESSION USED TO ESTIMATE DISTRIBUTION NET LENGTH
Dependent variable: Km of distribution net  OLS 




Region Real GDP percapita  4562.1330 
 (1199.965) 
Region population  -0.0026 
 (.0006) 
Area served (km2)  -1.4108 
 (.4277) 
Share of Industrial demand on total demand  -14279.4500 
 (6097.868) 
Heteroschedasticity test  Cook-Weisberg 
Ho: Constant variance (probability) 
0.7554a 
RESET specification test.  
Ho: model has no omitted variables (Probability) 
0.0301 a 




F test for general significance.  43 
Observations 25 
Notes: a. Results obtained from same model with constant CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 37
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TABLE A2.3
REGRESSION USED TO ESTIMATE NUMBER OF TRANSFORMERS
Dependent variable: Transformers number  OLS 
Consumer demand (GWh)  4.6089 
 (1.8984) 
Distribution net (km)  0.7689 
 (.2732) 




Region population  -0.0034 
 (.0015) 




Heteroschedasticity test  Cook-Weisberg 
Ho: Constant variance (probability) 
0.0971a 
RESET specification test.  
Ho: model has no omitted variables (Probability) 
0.8939 a 




F test for general significance.  132 
Observations 22 
Notes: a. Results obtained from same model with constant 38 PERFORMANCE AND EFFICIENCY IN COLOMBIA’S POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM: EFFECTS OF THE 1994 REFORM




CHB  Central Hidroeléctrica de Betania 
CHEC  Central Hidroeléctrica de Caldas 
CEDELCA  Centrales Electricas del Cauca S.A. 
CEDENAR  Centrales Eléctricas de Nariño S.A. 
CENS  Centrales Eléctricas del Norte de Santander SA 
CORELCA   Corporación Eléctrica de la Costa Atlántica 
CREG   Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas 
CVC   Corporación Autónoma del Cauca 
ELECTROCOSTA  Electrificadora de la Costa S.A. ESP 
ELECTRICARIBE  Electrificadora del Caribe S.A ESP 
EMCALI  Empresas Municipales de Cali 
EPM  Empresas Públicas de Medellín 
EPSA  Empresa de Energía Pacifico S.A. 
ESSA  Electrificadora de Santander S.A. 
EEB  Empresa de Energía de Bogotá 
DNP  Departamento Nacional de Planeación 
FEN  Financiera Eléctrica Nacional  
HUILA  Electrificadora del Huila S.A. 
ICEL  Instituto Colombiano de Energía Eléctrica 
ISA  Interconexión Eléctrica SA 
MME  Ministerio de Minas y Energía 
TOLIMA  Electrificadora del Tolima S.A. 
SSPD  Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios 
UPME  Unidad de Planeación Minero Energética CARLOS POMBO, RODRIGO TABORDA 39
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TABLE A3.2
REGRESSION EQUATIONS EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
THE POWER SECTOR DATASETS
Power sector statistics in Colombia are split among the following institutions:
i) The National Grid Company (Interconexión Eléctrica S.A); ii) the Mining and Energy
Planning Unit (UPME); iii) the Electricity and Gas Regulatory Commission (CREG); iii) the
National Planning Department (DNP); and iv) the Superintendent of Domiciliary Public Services
(SSPD). As a result, each source has a different format and contents.
The information is sorted out either by plant, utilities, regional electricity markets, regional
geographical provinces, or simply at a countrywide aggregate level. The Table A2.1 describes
the contents of the collected datasets.
Independent variable  Definition 
Log (S / L)  Logarithm of value of sales over number of employees on 
electricity distribution. 
Log (S-GWh / Transf)  Logarithm of sales in GWh over number of transformers on 
the system. 
Log (S-GWh / Net)  Logarithm of sales in GWh over kilometers of distribution net. 
Users / Km2  Total users over squared kilometers of area served. 
Ind-sales / Res-sales  Industrial sales in GWh over residential sales in GWh. 
Log (Local GDP pc)  Logarithm of local GDP per-cápita. 
Sales / Users  Total sales in GWh over total of users. 
Net Income / Sales  Net Income over value of sales 
Net Income / Net Worth  Net Income over net worth 
Regulatory Change  Dummy on regulatory reform. 1986-95 = 0; 1996 - 2001 = 1. 
Ownr  Dummy on ownership after regulatory reform. Private = 1; 
Public = 0. 
Structure  Dummy for bussines activities: Integrated utility = 1, Fully 
specialized in distribution = 0  
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TABLE A3.3
COLOMBIA – POWER SECTOR STATISTICS – DATA SET DESCRIPTION
ISA-Reports  Operative Reports of the National Interconnected System 
(1995-1999)   - Hydrology 
    - Grid Constraints 
    - Generation 
    - Demand 
    - Available effective capacity 
   The Electricity Spot Market Report 
   - Pool's prices & contacts 
   - Total traded amount (GWh) 
   - Pool's marginal supply prices by type of generation 
SIVICO (1997-1999)  The following data available by utility level: 
Source: SSPD  Financial Statements  
   - Income statement 
   - Balance sheet 
   Labor Statistics  
   - number of employees by sector's activity 
   - number of employees by occupational category 
   - number of employees by type of generation 
   Market composition by type of users 
   - consumption 
   - invoicing 
   - number of subscribers 
   - average tariffs by users 
   Results and Performance control process indicators 
   - quality service indicators 
   - spending & indebtedness indicators 
SIEE (1070-1998)  The Economic and Energetic Information System is a dataset that 
covers the Latin American Economies Energetic Statistics 
Source: OLADE  The SIEE sections are: 
   - prices 
   - demand and supply 
   - energetic Equipment 
   - environmental impact 
   - economic + energetic indicators 
    -world-wide energetic statistics 
FEN (1983-1994)  The power sector historical financial data. The database offers a 
summary by power company of 
   - income statements 
   - balance sheets 
   - other variables: purchase + sales of bulk electricity; 
     available capacity; power losses 
SINSE (1970-1994)  The power sector national system is a comprehensive database. The data 
is available by utility and regional market. 
Source: MME  The SINSE chapters are 
   - energetic balances 
   - generation and Electricity Demand 
   - number and type of subcribers 
   - average tariffs by users 
 